

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO	[Redacted]	
NO	1206 [Signature]	
REMARKS:		
FYI - copy sent to [Redacted]		
[Redacted]		
Did you read that rpt & return it?		
[Redacted]		
FROM:	4C-20 Hq [Redacted]	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	[Redacted]
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 66		
REPLACES FORM 36-3 WHICH MAY BE USED.		

C O N F I D E N T I A L

26 August 1983

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Declassification of GAO report on Federal Agencies' Roles
in Combatting Domestic Terrorism

In response to a request from [redacted] from the
Classification Review Division, Office of Information Services, DDA,
[redacted] reviewed the GAO report prepared for Senator
Denton on the "Federal Agencies' Roles in The Government's Evolving
Program to Combat Domestic Terrorism" to determine if there was any
CIA information contained therein which would prohibit the report from
being declassified. There is no substantive CIA information in the
report, and CIA per se is mentioned very little. Accordingly, [redacted]
position is that we have no objection to the declassifying of the
report. This was phoned to [redacted] on 26 August.

[redacted]

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

15 March 1983

Ambassador Robert M. Sayre
Director, Office for Combatting Terrorism
Room 2513
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Bob:

We have reviewed the draft GAO report "Federal Agencies' Role in the Government's Evolving Program to Combat Domestic Terrorism".

As stated, in the body of the report, the CIA'S role in domestic terrorism is limited to coordinating with the FBI available intelligence on international terrorist organizations which may be relevant to the work of agencies involved in attempting to resolve a given incident. As our role is proscribed in this type of circumstance, we believe substantive comments relating to the draft are more appropriately generated by those agencies whose involvement is, by law, more direct.

We would note, however, that as the draft report outlines current problem areas and sensitive coordination gaps in the functioning of the counterterrorism mechanism, the material should be classified at least "Confidential" (we would prefer "Secret") to preclude its broad distribution and possible misuse by the very types of elements the counterterrorism program is designed to defeat.

15/
[Redacted]
International Activities Division,
[Redacted]

S E C R E T